1: Titiev E-5 (1948) 1951 SG4 Araucanians SG4
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of his victim, by a man who abducted a bride without previous arrangement, by a lover who took another man's wife, or by the husband or family of a witch who happened to escape the death sentence. Under certain conditions, too, *llañkan* had to be paid to his affinal relatives by a spouse whose wife had died, even if the husband was not blamed for her death.

Nevertheless, despite his weighty responsibilities, the authority of a *loñko* was strictly limited. For the most part, he served only as the representative and spokesman of his unit, and he was expected to hold frequent assemblies of his adult, masculine followers, *kon·as*, in order to determine their wishes in advance.[38] Because of this custom a chief's power depended largely on his ability to sway his men through the skillful use of oratory.[39] He was also esteemed in proportion to his wealth in terms of land, herds, wives, and household goods. To some extent, the welfare of the people was supposed to depend on the leaders, for it was widely believed that the advent of evil times presaged the death of a prominent man.

If a chief died or if his *kon·as* wished to depose him, neighboring caciques were called in to supervise the choice of a new leader. A large assembly of the men concerned was held, and all principals or their spokesmen were given a thorough hearing. When all had spoken, the presiding chiefs selected as the new *loñko* the candidate who seemed to have the best qualifications and the greatest support of his prospective retainers. There was no fixed policy of tenure for the chief, but, unless he aroused tremendous opposition, he usually served for life.

Molina wrote that the Araucanian "state" was partitioned into four independent districts called *uthal-mapu*, each of which was led by a *toqui*. Every *uthal-mapu* was divided into five "provinces" and each of these in turn was subdivided into nine "counties" presided over by *ulmens*.[40] Several early sources re-

[38] Cf. Smith, 1855, pp. 241–43; Moesbach, 1930, pp. 122–38; and Edwards, 1930, 14 ff.

[39] See Moesbach, 1930, p. 126; and Cooper, 1946, p. 737.

[40] Molina, 1808, II: 55–56.

1: Titiev E-5 (1948) 1951 SG4 Araucanians SG4
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631 ferred to similar sociopolitical structures, but their data are too fragmentary and their terminology too inconsistent to provide a clear presentation.[41] All authors agree on two points. Whatever the true nature of the system may have been, it functioned best in times of war; and the smaller units were autonomous except during emergencies.

622 512 From a review of all the known facts it seems evident that far beyond all other considerations, a local chief's prestige depended on the number of able-bodied men at his disposal. [721] Even when they were nominally at peace the Araucanians frequently carried out intratribal raids, known as *malones*.[42] In [621] this practice the political and kinship systems merge into one, for the size of a *loñko's* following depended primarily on the [515] number of sons he and the men of his lineage begot. That explains why polygyny was so widely practiced and why great chiefs commonly amassed as many as twenty wives apiece.[43] Almost invariably, the authority of a *loñko* was restricted to kinfolk, and the central core of his following was formed by those members of his patrilineal lineage who would have resided in his household under the ancient scheme of unilocal, patrilocal residence. It is significant that during an interview on this subject Juan Antinao voluntarily defined a *loñko* as *la cabeza de la familia y su reducción*.[44] Such an interpretation is also supported by the fact that chiefs are known whose following numbered only 120 to 130 persons.[45]

624 Under the traditional form of Araucanian social organization, each chief was assisted by two important officials called *werkens*.

[41] Cooper, 1946, p. 725. Latcham (1924) devoted his fifth and sixth chapters to lengthy discussions of these supposed sociopolitical units, but throughout he stressed their ceremonial or totemic implications.

[42] Latcham (1909, p. 354): "Armed raids (*malones*) were constantly made on the neighboring villages. . . ." A vivid description of a large-scale attack occurs in Moesbach, 1930, pp. 270–87.

[43] Latcham, 1909, p. 359.

[44] Similar statements to the effect that chiefs had authority only over kin may be found in numerous places. See, for example, Latcham, 1909, pp. 356–57; Edwards, 1930, p. 13; and Cooper, 1946, p. 726.

[45] Housse, 1939, pp. 249 and 282.

4:Latcham F-5 (1888-1893) 1909 SG4 Araucanians SG4

near the snow land, was the region of the lower Andes, and *Pire-mapu*, snow land, the upper ranges. 131

The error was fallen into of considering these as political divisions, instead of geographical; a mistake in which many later writers have continued. As a matter of fact there was no political organisation, as we understand the term, and the Araucanos recognised no supreme chief, save only in times of great national peril, and then only in a military sense, and by public election. The danger over, they returned to their former customs, the functions of the chief ceasing from the moment the army was disbanded. 631

The basis of their social and political life is the family, which develops into a clan, and afterwards a tribe, absolutely independent one from the other. The clan itself was called *lov*, the village occupied by it *rehue*, the group of villages inhabited by the tribe *eilla-rehue*, literally nine villages. 619 621 [594]

The clan or *lov* was governed by the head of the family or *ulmen*, the tribe by the hereditary descendant of the founder or *apo-ulmen*, a contraction of *mapu-ulmen*, chief of the land.

Their villages were small, the third generation generally leaving them to form another, at a short distance away. 621

The authority of these chiefs descended from father to eldest son, save in the case of physical or mental incapability, when a new chief is chosen, generally another son, brother, or near relative of the deceased. 622

The authority of these *ulmens* is, however, little more than nominal, and is confined almost exclusively to the direction of their feasts and ceremonies, and in a lesser degree to the political economy of the group.

All important matters are treated in common council by the adult males, the chief presiding at the meeting. No tribute is paid him, neither is he exempt from sharing the daily tasks of the clan, although in a general way he assumes the management. [623]

Both the *ulmens* and *apo-ulmens* are known under the common title of *toqui*, from the stone axe worn round their necks, which is a symbol of their authority and which bears that name. The Spaniards following the custom prevalent through the whole of America gave them the generic name of cacique.

In time of national warfare, the tribes of the different zones or *mapu*, also called *butamapu*, united under a general or war chief called *ianco*. This post was usually hereditary during the time of the Spanish wars, although in the beginning the occupant was elected from among the most famous warriors by popular vote. 619 701

When the Araucanos began to adopt a more sedentary life, it became necessary to establish more firmly their *admapu* (customs of the land), or code of laws. Their quarrels were formerly settled by an appeal to arms; now however the *ulmen* called together the elders of the clan and they deliberated on the evidence given, and imposed punishment for the crime committed. It was not considered necessary to hear the offender. 627

5:Cooper E-4 (no date) 1946 SG4 Araucanians SG4

Decisions regarding peacetime affairs and warlike undertakings were usually made in conferences of the responsible men and subheads at the house or meeting-ground of the head or "chief" after free expression of views and by common agreement. There was a certain loose hierarchy of honor and status (rather than of authority proper) embracing higher and lower heads and "chiefs"—which brings us to the less clear features of the *Mapuche-Huilliche* sociopolitical structure. 623

The largest geographical division among the *Mapuche-Huilliche* was the vutanmapu (? + country). Three such divisions were recognized in earlier times, constituting longitudinal strips along the Coast, the central valley, and the sub-Andine region, respectively, from the Bío-Bío River to the Toltén River; to which were later added a fourth embracing the *Huilliche* country south of the Toltén to lat. 42° S., and a fifth, the Andean Cordillera region. These great divisions functioned chiefly, it would seem, in times of war. 619 631

The next smaller division was the aillarewe (nine + rewe), of which there were, according to Latcham's tabulation (1922 b, pp. 839–46), 50 or 51 south of the Itata River, and exclusive of Chiloé. The aillarewe was made up of a number of smaller groups, usually nine but sometimes more or fewer, generally called levo in the earliest sources, and rewe (regua) in the later ones. The levo or rewe was in turn made up of a small number of cavi (cabí), and each of these latter in turn, at least in the south, of several machulla (mŭchulla) or pichicavi (small + cavi). The foregoing was the more common, but not invariable, division and terminology.

Data on the size of these respective subdivisions are very fragmentary. According to Mariño de Lovera (1865, p. 140), each cavi in the Valdivia area had 400 "indios," with each component machulla consisting of "pocos indios." Latcham (1922 b, pp. 383–84) estimated the population of the levo (or rewe) to have been from about 1,600 to 4,000.

Our sources are fairly clear that each machulla, cavi, and levo (rewe) had some sort of headman. (Mariño de Lovera, 1865, p. 140; Olaverría, 1863, p. 22; Bascuñan, 1863, p. 187.) These headmen whose office was, as above noted, usually hereditary, functioned in normal times, in contrast to the leaders of the larger divisions, who earlier appear to have been mostly elected, and elected predominantly for the conduct of war. Such normal-time headmen and wartime leaders were variously known as loŋko, toki, rewe, gl'men—titles applied by our earlier sources with little consistency. In general, the title of loŋko (head) seems to have been given more to headmen of lower and smaller subdivisions, toki (ax) to headmen of rewes or of higher subdivisions. The title of gl'men means literally "noble, rich person" rather than headman; not all headmen were gl'mens, and vice versa. 619 631 622

Vertical relationships in the political hierarchy are not clearly defined

5:Cooper E-4 (no date) 1946 SG4 Araucanians SG4

619 in our sources. According to one witness (cited by Latcham, 1922 b, p. 363), no one cavi was subject to any other cavi; according to Mariño 631 de Lovera (1865, p. 140), the heads of the machullas were subject to 622 the head of the cabi which the machullas constituted. Given the general democratic decentralized pattern of *Mapuche-Huilliche* political life, we may be reasonably confident that such "subjection" of smaller to larger unit in the political hierarchy as may have existed must have been close to purely nominal.

622 Each small "farming community" of three to seven or more huts (cf. supra under Settlements) had its own headman, a richer or older man or a descendant of caciques. (Ascasubi, 1846, p. 355; cf. Mariño de Lovera, 1865, pp. 124, 140.) Luis de Valdivia (1887, s. v.) defined cuga (kuga) not only as a lineage and as the name thereof, but also as "la cabeça de parientes, el que es como cacique, e indio principal." Rosales (1877–78, 1:137) states that the "caciques," who with the "toquies" are the only persons of dignity, were "las cabezas de las familias y linajes, de modo que no tiene un cacique que le reconozca mas de los de su linage." How and where these headmen of farming communities and heads of families or kinship groups fitted into the political hierarchy above outlined is not clear from our sources. The 621 facts we have seem best explained on the provisional hypothesis that the small farming communities, and perhaps clusters of such communities, constituting machullas and cavis respectively, were exclusively or preponderantly made up of closely related kin.

In the course of time, particularly after the beginning of the 622 19th century, a certain increase of executive and judicial power and authority accrued to peacetime headmen of the different ranks, and the earlier atomistic peacetime political structure assumed somewhat greater unity, cohesion, and hierarchization. But the basic democratic forms and functions persisted largely intact. (For military organization, see infra under Warfare.)

Law and legal procedure.—The chief crimes recognized were adult- 674 ery and wife-stealing, murder, theft, homicidal sorcery, and treason. The offended party and his kin dealt with the offender; in earlier times, 627 headmen and other caciques had little or no authority to try cases or 754 to pronounce judgment. Adultery, murder, and sorcery were punishable by death, and sometimes were actually so punished; but, more commonly, in cases of adultery and murder, composition was resorted to, with payment of strings of llaukas, 10 such strings for one death. Marcgrav (1648, p. 287) states that the sorcerer was burnt alive—as is also recorded among the Argentine *Araucanians* by Barbará (1930, p. 44). (Cf. similar *Chiriguano* treatment of sorcerers, and Molina, 1901, p. 154, on torture of sorcerers to force revelation of accomplices. For fuller details on law and judicial procedure, cf., e. g., Guevara Silva, 1904, pp. 40–59.)

7:Padden H-4 (no date) 1957 SG4 Araucanians SG4

of his equipment and his inability to dodge through the forest undergrowth, did not have a chance for his life.[25]

The idea of Indians running down horses is not as incredible as it at first seems. In the heat of summer, when most of the fighting took place, the Spanish mounts tired quickly, especially after the long trip to the Indian ambuscade. Besides this, the Araucanians were accustomed to hunting wild game by literally chasing it to death. This required a tireless trot, at which they were proficient. Profiting by the lessons of their own strategy, the Araucanians devised an extremely light saddle in order to increase the endurance of their mounts on long rides. When they used captured Spanish saddles they first cut them down so as to make them considerably lighter.[26]

Shortly after the turn of the century, by 1611 to be exact, the Indians developed a cavalry that in terms of mobility was superior to the Spanish. They likewise possessed the best horses in the whole of Chile. These advantages were demonstrated in more daring raids on Spanish towns and a willingness to meet the Spanish cavalry on its own ground.[27] From this time forward the war passed into a new phase in which Araucanian offensive power became an increasingly significant factor. The source of that power, of course, lay in mastery of the horse. In little more than a generation the animal from which the Indians had once fled in terror had been incorporated into their culture, transforming it into a factor of defiant military power, dedicated to the eradication of Spanish culture. The Spaniards were not only dismayed to recognize this development of Araucanian military strength, but were piqued as well at the sight of barbarous savages riding horses with an air of equality. In answer to Spanish resentment the Indians pledged never to quit their war for freedom and their horses to enter serfdom on foot.[28]

The existence of a skilled and effective military force bespeaks the presence of a comparable political organization under whose genius it is formed and directed. In the development of Araucanian political organization the chronicles indicate two major forces at work: the geographical particularism in which the Araucanians traditionally lived and a counter-force provoked by the presence of the enemy and inclining towards Araucanian unity. Throughout the first century

25 Marmolejo, pp. 46-48, 47-49. These are but representative of many such descriptions.

26 Nájera, pp. 42, 110-116. Cooper (p. 704) gives the impression that Indian saddles and riding gear were nothing more than crude imitations of Spanish models.

27 Nájera, pp. 107-110; "Informe de Juan de Xaraquemada," May 1, 1611 (Gay, II, p. 239); Xaraquemada to King, Jan. 29, 1611 and Jan. 28, 1612 (*idem*, pp. 247, 253-257); Alonso García Ramón to King, 1613 (*idem*, p. 267).

28 Nájera, p. 116. Whenever the Indians found it necessary or advisable to grant a temporary peace, the Spaniards first insisted that they turn in their horses and move about on foot, as subject persons were expected to do. The Indians invariably turned in their *recuentos*, keeping their good stock hidden for use after the next rebellion (*idem*, p. 128).

7:Padden H-4 (no date)1957 SG4 Araucanians SG4

of conquest ancient localism clashed with incipient nationalism. This conflict produced a political ambivalence which in itself contributed heavily to the cause of Araucanian independence. Centralization of politico-military authority was achieved to a point where successful resistance was possible, but did not develop to a stage where the Spaniards could defeat and usurp it.

The center of anti-Spanish unity was founded in what the Spanish termed *"el estado."* This was a geographical expression signifying the area that Valdivia held in personal encomienda.[29] It was these Indians, particularly those of Arauco, Tucapel, and Purén, who planned and carried out the revolt of 1553, and who assumed leadership of the resistance movement. After the first few years of bitter warfare the Spaniards began to imbue the term estado with political connotations, hence Don Alonso de Ercilla's image of *"el estado indómito"* was much more than a flight of poetic fancy.[30]

It is virtually certain that the Indians, in pre-Hispanic days, were in the habit of seeking transient familial and friendship alliances in the conduct of war between localities. Upon their first major defeat by Valdivia, following which he recrossed the Biobío and founded Concepción, the more intelligent Indian leaders voiced a wide call to arms.[31] The resulting alliance was effective in that it led to the downfall of Valdivia, but it had no permanent character. With each new Spanish thrust the caciques of the estado had to reform alliances and seek wider support for their efforts. In 1536, for example, Lautaro and the chiefs established relations with the Indians of Santiago, attempting to incite them to rebellion.[32] Temporary alliances were both frequent and effective. In search of allies the chiefs used glass beads, dogs, and various types of Spanish plunder to effect

29 Olaverría, p. 20. The area included the Indian localities of Talcamavida, Laucamilla, Catiray, Marigueño, Angol, Arauco, Andalicán, Tucapel, and Purén. After the estado had been recognized as a political entity the term was applied to all or part of it. In essence, the term estado came to mean the center of Indian resistance, whether it embraced all of the above named provinces or merely one or two of them.

30 Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, ed., José Toribio Medina, *La Araucana* (5 vols., Santiago, 1910). Historians and anthropologists seem to be under a strange compulsion to use this poem as a prime documentary source. This is not to say that in select instances the practice is not warranted, but the wide use to which it has been put must certainly be held in question. Everyone knows that there is much truth in it, although seldom is it possible to determine precisely where it resides.

31 Marmolejo, pp. 22-23. It took nearly three years to organize the first rebellion. It is sometimes implied that the Araucanians were introduced to cooperative military effort on a large scale through attempted invasions by the Incas. This seems most unlikely because the Incas were held at the Maule River, and the Indians occupying this area, as nearly as can be ascertained, were the warlike Promaucaes, who were not Araucanians. Nor could the Inca invasions have had anything to do with the formation of the estado, since, as we have seen, it was created by the imposition of Spanish dominion, without which it could have had no meaning.

32 *Idem*, pp. 61-62.

7:Padden H-4 (no date) 1957 SG4 Araucanians SG4

negotiations.[32] There also developed a type of Indian mercenary who supplied his own weapons and served for a specified length of time at a prearranged scale of pay.[34]

It seems quite clear that there was no pan-Araucanian sentiment to which the estado could appeal. When local chiefs were asked for troops they not uncommonly rejected the request. If they acceded to the demand, they chose the bravest man for a leader and dispatched the force under his command. Service was performed in the estado's forces for no more consideration than lodging and hospitable treatment. In the event of mortality the close relatives of the fallen warrior were compensated by the residents of the province in whose defense he died.[35]

Some of the localities simply did not want to fight the Spaniards, preferring to make the best of conditions under Spanish rule. The Indians around Angol, for instance, joined the Spaniards in war against the estado for a number of years. While the estado leaders accused them of subverting the general Indian cause, the Angol tribes retaliated with accusations of plunder and theft.[36] The estado, with its own crops destroyed by warfare, never hesitated to raid the stores of those who were not immediately allied to the cause. Araucanians who refused to fight were subjected to violent reprisal.[37] Even in the province of Arauco all was not unanimity. An old chief was forced to flee with his family and take refuge in the Spanish fort in Arauco because he would not support the war, thereby giving evidence of pro-Spanish sympathies.[38] It is difficult to guess how many others there might have been.

By 1594, according to Olaverría, the estado claimed suzerainty over all of the allareguas from the Biobío to the Imperial River, and was held in dread by all of the Indians as far south as Osorno. The estado was so feared and respected, he said, that Indians in the extreme south would break the peace when the chiefs of the estado so desired.[39] Nevertheless, the chiefs never succeeded in gaining effective suzerainty, even for purposes of war. Authority continued to be local,

33 *Idem*, pp. 105, 133.

34 Juan de Herrera, "Relación de las cosas de Chile" (CHC, vol. 2, p. 251).

35 Olaverría, p. 23.

36 Menendejo, pp. 126-127.

37 *Idem*, p. 83. The Indians around the settlements who were friendly towards the Spanish were rarely raised by the depredations of the estado's warriors. Crops were burned or stolen, and women and children were carried off to be used as drudges. See Alonso García Ramón to the King, 1613 (Gay, II, pp. 270, 279); "Informe de Juan de Xarquemendo" (*idem*, pp. 241-242; Méjon, p. 69). Through acts of terror the estado sometimes forced friendly Indians to rebel against the Spanish. Through malevolent intervention the Spanish sometimes achieved the same end. Plundering of Indian stores and raping of their women brought alienation and revolt. See Francisco Núñez de Pineda y Bascuñán, *Cautiverio feliz* (CHC, vol. 3, pp. 51-52).

38 Menendejo, pp. 110-113.

39 Olaverría, p. 22.

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rather than central, and coöperation was most often found in the realm of diplomacy.

With the turn of the century a more precise political and military division was created by the Araucanians. The region between the Biobío and Toltén Rivers was divided into three longitudinal strips called *butanmapos;* they were the sub-Andean range, the central valley, and the coastal strip (including the estado). Each butanmapo had clearly defined limits and jurisdictions; each had, at least in time of war, a principal chief, or *toque*. It was customary for the chiefs to debate plans for war in a parliamentary junta in which the three territories were represented. Strategy was agreed upon by common consent.[40] The relationship between the local chiefs and territorial toques is not clear, but it seems likely that military power was held to both qualify status and to assure authority. When disagreement occurred between toques, war between territories could and did sometimes develop.[41]

Gerónimo Pietas, writing around 1729, describes a further development of this general schema. At this time the territorial strips had been increased to four in number. These provinces were still called butanmapos, but they extended farther north and south than did the older territories. This extension of Araucania is mute testimony to the growth of Araucanian strength and confidence. In Pietas' description each butanmapo had a hierarchy of three superior chiefs: a *toqui-guilmen* (commander), a *guinca-guilmen* (field commander), and a *pelqui-guilmen* (diplomatic courier). While these officers assumed absolute authority in their positions within the province, they were inferior to a *toque-general* who apparently wielded a measure of authority over the whole of Araucania. He further describes a conventionalization of diplomacy involving three forms for the calling of war. A general war could be called for only by the toque-general, and at his own discretion. When he desired to begin hostilities word was passed to all chiefs through a group of sub-chiefs called *coner*. Only the toque-general could dispatch the coners, and in the event of hostilities between the provinces, the fact of being called to council by a con was a guarantee of safe conduct. All chiefs attended the councils, wherein strategy was planned and forces drawn up.

War could also be called for by a regional toque. As messenger he sent his pelqui-guilmen to the other butanmapos, asking their aid and support, which they might or might not give. In the third instance war could be initiated by simply attacking the Spaniards. In this event the warring chieftain used force

40 Encuentros, pp. 39-41. Latcham (*La prehistoria chilena*, pp. 153-154) considers this to be an ancient Mapuche military organization, even though it is first reported almost a century after the Spaniards arrived. From what we know of the ancient Mapuche, this would appear to be an unduly sophisticated organization.

41 *Idem*, pp. 94-99, 144-148; "Relación de Luis de Valdivia," 1611 (Gay, II, pp. 281-282).

7:Padden H-4 (no date) 1957 SG4 Araucanians SG4

of arms to enlist the support of the local Indians for his designs.[42] As incomplete as this description is, it does give evidence of a relatively sophisticated politico-military organization which stands in sharp contrast against that of the first generation of estado caciques.

Development of religious beliefs among the Araucanians is a most difficult postulation because we know so very little about their pre-Hispanic religious ideas. The chroniclers generally agree that the spirits of Araucanian ancestors formed an important cult, each kinship group having an ultimate progenitor whose spirit was called *Pillán*. This spirit was believed to be immanent, and so could be propitiated. Before going into battle the Indians sometimes sought divination from oracles, and once having gained a victory in a given locality through the intercession of supernatural forces, they believed that they could not lose a subsequent battle in that particular place.[43] Given the immediate religious background of the chroniclers of the sixteenth century, one in which religious and nationalistic sentiment were perfectly united, and the omnipresent tradition of the *Reconquista*, one must always wonder if the early chroniclers reported what the Indians actually believed, or if they instead reflected the paths of their own cognition.

As the Spaniards made war in the name of an omnipotent God, the Araucanians appear to have rationalized a deity for their own defense. There were innumerable Pilláns hovering over every locality, and in the absence of concerted missionary effort they doubtless remained. In describing an Araucanian ceremonial that he witnessed in 1629 Bascuñan depicts an interesting bit of symbolism which suggests the evolution of a super-Pillán. The occasion of ceremony was the execution of a Spanish captive. Involved in the execution was a lance with three knives fixed to its end, representing the three butanmapos. After the captive's brains had been dashed out, his captor took from the lance that knife which represented his personal region of Araucania and used it to cut out the victim's heart. He sucked its blood, took tobacco smoke and blew it to the heavens, then passed the heart around to the other chiefs for similar usage, after which it was divided and eaten.[44] The three knives symbolized Araucania, and the sucking of blood was a

42 Gerónimo Pietas, "Noticias sobre las costumbres de los Araucanos" (Gay, II, pp. 489-493).

43 Manquelaja, p. 172; Nájera, p. 48; also see Latcham, *La prehistoria chilena*, pp. 193-194. Cooper (pp. 742-752) makes a noble attempt to unravel the confused threads of early Araucanian religious belief.

44 Bascuñan, pp. 39-43. The author was a captain of Spanish infantry and the son of Alonso Núñez de Pineda, *maestro de campo general*, one of Chile's distinguished soldiers. In 1629 the Araucanians crossed the Biobío and fell on Chillán. They captured Bascuñan and took him back to their stronghold. His captivity was one of those story book affairs, almost too romantic and dramatic to be real. He was befriended by Maulican, a powerful chieftain

10: Hilger E-5 (1946-1952) 1957
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Caniulaf; and Quele, "but Quele has no predominating family; it did not belong to the Araucanians until recent years." 621

In Alepúe area, boundaries of witran mapu are creeks, rivers, ravines, and the Pacific Ocean. In Panguipulli and Cofiaripe areas, they are lakes, rivers, and mountain ridges; in Boroa area, rivers, creeks, ridges of hills, and the Pacific.

In the early days several witran mapu united into an organization called aillarewe for such joint activities as the ŋillatun or protection against Spanish invaders. (Cf. Cooper, 1946, pp. 725-726.) An aillarewe was presided over by an outstanding cacique selected by the other caciques of the aillarewe. [631]

Domingo Huenun of Panguipulli, over 70 years old, recorded in a notebook, at the dictation of his granduncle, Antelef Huetra, an old man, the witran mapu of about 1930. These are given in table 4. The granduncle feared that the knowledge of them would be lost, if not written down somewhere. The witran mapu, the old man said, were those that he knew existed when he was a boy. The same notebook contained the names of past caciques of each unit, "those from very, very early times." In the granduncle's childhood days every boy was expected to be able to recite them from memory.

Today, as formerly, each witran mapu is headed by a cacique. Formerly, it was customary for the eldest son of a deceased cacique to inherit the position. After the cacique's death, the men of his witran mapu met. Women, also, were often present, and, if they were capable speakers, expressed their opinions at the meeting. Those assembled decided whether the eldest son was fit to be their cacique. If he was not considered an able man, another of the cacique's sons was chosen to fill the vacancy. If it happened that no son was considered fit, a man from another family was selected. "If the son of a cacique was able to speak well, could be relied on to carry messages, and to conduct meetings, and in general was an intelligent man, he was approved of." 622 [562]

Today, a meeting is seldom held to scrutinize a candidate's qualifications. In general, the eldest son takes over, either of his own volition or because he is encouraged to do so by interested and outstanding men of his witran mapu or by interested outsiders. When the old cacique of Alepúe area died (1941), his 45-year-old son, José Manuel Lienlaf, became the recognized cacique "because people went to him for advice and petitioned him to call the people together for a ŋillatun. Hualme, the late cacique of Mehuin, had no son to inherit his position, so the oldest man took it upon himself to be the cacique—he is older than 100 years." In 1947 the cacique for Panguipulli was Iapan